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An Implied Right of Action Under Section
17(a): The Supreme Court Has Said "No,"
But Is Anybody Listening?
DENNIS SCHOLL* and RONALD K. PERKOWSKI**
The authors critically examine recent lower court decisions
implying a private right of action under section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933. In light of recent Supreme Court deci-
sions, the authors conclude that the Supreme Court has effec-
tively precluded implied rights of action under section 17(a).
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I. INTRODUCTION
For many years section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 19331 was
* Associate with Arky, Freed, Stearns, Watson & Greer, P.A., Miami, Florida; J.D.,
University of Miami School of Law; B.B.A., Florida International University; former Arti-
cles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
** Associate with Howrey & Simon, Washington, D.C.; J.D., University of Miami
School of Law; A.B., Princeton University; former Articles and Comments Editor, Univer-
sity of Miami Law Review.
1. Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). Unless otherwise stated, all
references to § 17(a) are to this statute. Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in in-
terstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
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an infrequently used federal remedy for fraud.' Section 17(a), nar-
rower in scope than rule 10b-5,3 seemed doomed to an existence as
an alternative cause of action.4 The Supreme Court began the res-
urrection of section 17(a) as a viable private cause of action in 1976
when a series of its decisions, cutting back on the availability of
private actions under rule 10b-5, culminated in the case of Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder.5
Because of the limitations placed upon private actions brought
under rule 10b-5, commentators and the courts speculated about
the existence of an implied private right of action under section
17(a), and whether a showing of scienter6 would be a prerequisite
to such an action.7 Advocates of this theory grounded their argu-
ments upon the same policy considerations advanced on behalf of
rule 10b-5.8 The principal argument made for the creation of a pri-
vate right of action under section 17(a) suggests that recognition of
2. Dissatisfaction with § 17(a) was so great that Congress's failure to amend its provi-
sions to encompass frauds by purchasers led the Securities and Exchange Commission to
adopt rule 10b-5. See H. SowARDs, THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT § 10.01[1 (1981).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). Unless otherwise noted, all references to rule 10b-5 are
to this SEC regulation. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which oper-
ated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security.
4. See Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and Sec-
tion 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REV. 641 (1978).
5. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The Supreme Court held that negligence will not support a
private right of action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5.
Id. at 210.
6. In Hochfelder the Court defined scienter as "intent to deceive, manipulate, or de-
fraud," and imposed scienter as a requirement of recovery on a private plaintiff. Id. at 193.
7. See generally Hazen, supra note 4; Pitt, An SEC Insider's View of the Utility of
Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws, 5 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1977); Steinberg,
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 After Naftalin and Redington, 68 GEO. L.J. 163
(1979); Comment, Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act: An Alternative to the Recently
Restricted Rule 10b-5, 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 340 (1977). For cases which recognize a cause of
action since Hochfelder, see infra note 81.
8. Most authoritative commentators refute arguments in favor of a private right of ac-
tion under § 17(a) based upon congressional intent. See, e.g., 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 1784-86 (2d ed. 1961); H. SOWARDS, supra note 2; Horton, Section 17(a) of the 1933
Securities Act-The Wrong Place For a Private Right, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 44 (1973). But see
Hazen, supra note 4, at 656-58.
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an implied remedy complements the express remedies of the Se-
curities Act of 1933, thereby promoting the policy of investor pro-
tection that underlies the federal securities laws.9
Recently, the federal judiciary has focused considerable atten-
tion on the issue of an implied private right of action under section
17(a). Although the lower courts have greatly expanded the tradi-
tional scope of section 17(a), 10 the United States Supreme Court
has severely restricted private rights of action under rule 10b-5.'
The Supreme Court's recent decisions, moreover, clearly articulate
minimum criteria to determine if a person who alleges injury
caused by a securities fraud has a statutorily implied private
remedy."
The federal district and intermediate appellate courts have
been extremely willing to assist investors in correcting perceived
injustices, regardless of conflicting principles."3 With the demise of
rule 10b-5 as a plaintiff's cure-all, section 17(a) shows signs of be-
coming "the massive antifraud weapon in a plaintiff's arsenal that
section 10(b) was before the Supreme Court's restrictive decisions
in the securities area."
14
The federal courts' attempt to circumvent the restrictions
placed upon actions under rule 10b-5 by the use of section 17(a) as
a securities cure-all has resulted in bad law. This result occurs
whenever the courts invade the legislative domain and superim-
pose their own notions of equity upon those of Congress. With few
exceptions, 6 the federal judiciary is systematically ignoring or mis-
9. But see infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 57-78 and accompanying text. This article will show that the expan-
sion of § 17(a) by a portion of the lower federal courts violates the statutory scheme of the
federal securities laws.
11. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
12. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (no implied right
of private action under § 206 of Investment Advisers Act of 1940); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no implied right of private action under § 17(a) of 1934
Securities Exchange Act); cf. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (no implied right of action under Federal Water Pollution Control
Act and the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972); Texas Indus. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (no implied right of contribution under anti-
trust laws); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) (implied private right denied
under § 10 of Rivers and Harbor Appropriation Act of 1899); University Research Ass'n v.
Coutu, 450 U.S. 755 (1981) (no implied private right under Davis-Bacon Act for employee's
back wages); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (no implied right of
action under title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972).
13. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
14. Steinberg, supra note 7, at 185.
15. See, e.g., Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, 561 F.2d 152, 159 (8th Cir. 1977) (no
private right of action under § 17(a)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Goodweather v.
19811
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construing the recent trend of Supreme Court decisions in the se-
curities area.' This unilateral investor protection program has
been undertaken at the expense of another policy inherent in the
statutory scheme of the federal securities law: the maintenance of
an orderly securities market that allows American industry access
to capital infusions at the lowest cost commensurate with adequate
investor protection.
17
This article focuses on the lower court decisions since
Hochfelder, and the recent attempts to create an expansive inter-
pretation of section 17(a) in reaction to the restrictive treatment of
rule 10b-5. Moreover, the article analyzes the general theory of an
implied right of private action under section 17(a) in light of the
recent Supreme Court decisions in the area of implied rights. The
resulting conclusion is that the comparative advantages of applying
section 17(a) in private actions, rather than section 10b-5, do not
justify the courts' implication of these private rights of action.
II. THE LEGACY OF Hochfelder
Extensive documentation exists concerning the contraction of
private rights under rule 10b-5;'8 therefore detailed consideration
is not required here. In brief, the Supreme Court has restricted
private rights of action under rule 10b-5 by deciding in rapid suc-
cession that the plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securi-
Thompson & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,352, at 92,187, [July-Dec.] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 630, at
A-7 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 16, 1981) (no private action under § 17(a)); Hill v. Der, 521 F. Supp.
1370, 1374 (D. Del. 1981) (no private right implied in § 17(a)); Mendelsohn v. Capital Un-
derwriters, 490 F. Supp. 1069, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (open question as to existence of pri-
vate action under § 17(a)); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402,
404 n.3 (D. Colo. 1979) (no private rights under § 17(a)); Gunter v. Hutcheson, 433 F. Supp.
42, 45 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (no implied private right of action under § 17(a)).
16. See infra notes 60-78 and accompanying text.
17. Adequate investor protection does not require the protection of investors at any
cost. The intent of Congress to strike a balance in this area is clearly articulated in the
Congressional Record: "This legislation is designed to protect not only the investing public
but at the same time to protect honest corporate business." 77 CONG. REc. 2935 (1933)
(statement of Rep. Chapman); see also infra note 118.
The Supreme Court has recognized the congressional intent to strike a balance in this
area. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979) ("[N]either this Court nor
Congress has ever suggested that investor protection was the sole purpose of the Securities
Act." (emphasis in original)); SEC V. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186
(1963).
18. See, e.g., A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD (1981); Lowen-
fels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum
Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891 (1977).
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ties,'9 prove scienter existed in the fraudulent sale,20 and show an
element of deception in the sale or purchase. 1
A. The Rebirth of Section 17(a)
For the purpose of analyzing section 17(a), Hoch/elder must
be regarded as the seminal case. On the strength of lower court
precedents, the Supreme Court recognized a private cause of action
under rule 10b-5,2 but imposed a scienter requirement.23 The
Court noted that no evidence existed of any congressional intent to
validate the implication of a private remedy under the rule, but
still treated the existence of such a right as "well-established.
12 4
The Court's casual recognition of the private right under rule 10b-
5, together with an express reservation on the issue whether an im-
plied right exists pursuant to section 17(a),'8 opened the door for
the lower courts to imply a remedy under section 17(a). 26
The Hochfelder Court concentrated its examination on the ap-
plication of a scienter requirement in rule 10b-5 private actions.2
7
Initially, the Court looked to the statutory construction of section
10(b),'2 8 focusing on the rule's phrase, "manipulative or decep-
tive."2 9 It found that the language evinced a strong congressional
intent to prohibit only knowing or intentional misconduct.2 0 The
19. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
20. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
21. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
22. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196.
23. Id. at 214.
24. Id. at 196; see Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13
n.9 (1971).
25. The Court stated:
Respondents further contend that Ernst & Ernst owed them a direct duty
under § 17(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 17a-5 to conduct a proper audit of First
Securities and that they may base a private cause of action against Ernst &
Ernst for violation of that duty. Respondents' cause of action, however, was pre-
mised solely on the alleged violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. During the
lengthy history of this litigation they have not amended their original complaint
to aver a cause of action under § 17(a) and Rule 17a-5. We therefore do not
consider that a claim of liability under § 17(a) is properly before us even assum-
ing respondents could assert such a claim independently of § 10(b).
425 U.S. at 194 n.13.
26. For citation and discussion of cases that have implied a private right of action since
Hochfelder, see infra note 81 and accompanying text.
27. For the definition of scienter, see supra note 6.
28. 425 U.S. at 197.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Unless otherwise noted, all references to § 10(b) are to
this statute.
30. 425 U.S. at 197.
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lower federal courts have relied upon this initial focus and the ab-
sence of similar language in section 17(a) to justify holding that
scienter is not required in either private suits or SEC enforcement
actions under section 17(a). 81 This lower court treatment of section
17(a) in enforcement actions occurred, however, before the Su-
preme Court decision in Aaron v. SEC."'
A focus, however, merely on the absence of statutory language
in section 17(a) is superficial and misinterprets the Hochfelder
opinion. Writing for the Hochfelder Court, Justice Powell rejected
the SEC argument that the federal securities laws' overall policy of
investor protection mandates the prohibition of negligent, as well
31. See, e.g., Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir. 1979) (ab-
sence of words such as "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" negates need for
scienter requirement in § 17(a) actions); SEC v. American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001, 1006
(4th Cir. 1978) (no manipulative device language in § 17(a), therefore scienter is not an
element); SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950
(1979). The language in § 10(b) relied on so heavily by the Supreme Court in imposing a
scienter requirement is not present in § 17(a). But see Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554
F.2d 790, 795-96 (7th Cir. 1977) (imposing scienter requirement for private action under §
17(a)(2)); Felts v. National Account Sys. Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54, 64 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (re-
quirements for cause of action under § 17(a) are same as those under § 10(b) and rule 10b-
5); Malik v. Universal Resources Corp., 425 F. Supp. 350, 363 (S.D. Cal. 1976) (scienter an
essential element of proof under § 17(a)).
The language of § 17(a) and rule 10b-5 are remarkably similar. They are, in fact, identi-
cal except for the language noted in the text and the "in connection with the purchase or
sale of" phrase in rule 10b-5. Compare supra note 1 with supra note 3. The similarity is far
from coincidental. Rule 10b-5 was, in effect, copied from § 17(a) with suitable modifications
intended to expand investor protection beyond the scope of the 1933 Act. As explained by
Milton Freeman, an SEC attorney who had a hand in the drafting process:
I was sitting in my office in the S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a
call from Jim Treanor who was then the Director of the Trading and Exchange
Division. He said, "I have just been on the telephone with Paul Rowen," who
was then the S.E.C. Regional Administrator in Boston, "and he has told me
about the president of some company in Boston who is going around buying up
the stock of his company from his own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has
been telling them that the company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the
earnings are going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share for this coming
year. Is there anything we can do about it?" So he came upstairs and I called in
my secretary and I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put
them together, and the only discussion we had there was where "in connection
with the purchase or sale" should be, and we decided it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't remem-
ber whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of
paper around to all the commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and
they tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except
Sumner Pike who said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?"
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Law, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967)
(remarks of Milton Freeman).




as knowing and intentional conduct. The opinion set forth a
lengthy analysis of both the 1933 and the 1934 Acts, noting that
the two Acts "constituted interrelated components of the federal
regulatory scheme governing transactions in securities."83 "In each
instance that Congress created express civil liability in favor of
purchasers or sellers of securities it clearly specified whether recov-
ery was to be premised on knowing or intentional conduct, negli-
gence, or entirely innocent mistake. 3 4 The opinion examined the
policy that underlies investor protection and relied on more than
merely the language of section 10(b). The Court took the position
that the policy of investor protection is insufficient justification for
the judiciary to interfere with the statutory scheme intended by
Congress. 5
B. The Question of Scienter After Aaron
Despite the position of the Supreme Court in Hochfelder, the
courts have rarely had any qualms about interfering with a statu-
tory scheme in order to imply a private right of action under sec-
tion 17(a). Two factors motivate this practice: First, extending sec-
tion 17(a) enables courts to apply it to situations in which the
judicially constrained rule 10b-5 can no longer reach."' Second, and
more important, actions under section 17(a) provide plaintiffs with
the opportunity to avoid the scienter element now required for pri-
vate actions under rule 10b-5. Both motivations emanate from the
use of incorrect legal propositions in cases in which courts have
imposed their own notions of equity.
Many of the recent decisions dealing with rule 10b-5 s7 and sec-
33. 425 U.S. at 206.
34. Id. at 207. See infra note 120 for sections of the statutes containing express civil
remedies.
35. A dissent by Justice Blackmun stated that the majority opinion "stultifies recovery
for the victim." 425 U.S. at 216. He reluctantly conceded that the statutory scheme "once
again. . . rests with Congress to rephrase and to re-enact, if investor victims, such as these,
are ever to have relief under the federal securities laws." Id. at 218.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Jensen, 608 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1979). In Jensen the
Tenth Circuit held that § 17(a) applies to any transaction involving the sale of stock. The
United States Supreme Court, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975), required that a plaintiff be a purchaser or seller of securities before bringing a pri-
vate action under rule 10b-5. The Jensen court, by requiring that merely a sale be involved,
extended § 17(a) to an area no longer protected by rule 10b-5.
37. See, e.g., SEC v. Caterinicchia, 613 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1980) (scienter required in
SEC actions brought under rule 10b-5); SEC v. Cenco, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1977)
(scienter required). See generally Note, The Scienter Requirement in SEC Injunctive En-
forcement of Section 10(b) After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77 COLUM. L. RaV. 419
(1977); Note, Scienter and Injunctive Relief Under Rule 1~b-5, 11 GA. L. REv. 879 (1977).
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tion 17(a) 5 focus on whether it is necessary to prove scienter in an
SEC enforcement action. This line of lower court cases is signifi-
cant because some courts have analyzed the scienter requirement
in terms that apply to both private and SEC enforcement actions
brought under section 17(a).39
The Supreme Court attempted to halt this expansion of sec-
tion 17(a) in Aaron v. SEC.40 In Aaron the Court affirmatively an-
swered the question expressly reserved in Hochfelder, "whether
scienter is a necessary element in an action for injunctive relief
under . . . rule 10b-5.'4 1 The question of a scienter requirement in
section 17(a) injunctive actions brought by the SEC was also ex-
amined by the Court. Certiorari was granted on these issues to re-
solve numerous conflicting circuit court opinions regarding the ne-
cessity of scienter in a SEC injunctive action."'
In a bifurcated analysis the Aaron Court held that a SEC in-
junctive action brought under section 17(a)(1) requires a showing
of scienter, but that scienter is not required under sections 17(a)(2)
or 17(a)(3).'3 The Court distinguished the two areas by analyzing
and comparing the statutory language. No language was found to
38. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (scienter required in SEC actions brought under
rule 10b-5 and § 17(a)(1), but not under § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3)); Steadman v. SEC, 603
F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979) (scienter not an element under § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3)); SEC v.
American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001, 1006 (4th Cir. 1978) (scienter not required under §
17(a)(2)).
39. The significance of these cases is enhanced because the courts seem to be proceed-
ing more cautiously than the commentators. Only one district court has implied a private
right of action in a case in which the existence of scienter was determinative, holding that
scienter was not an element. In re Gap Stores Secs. Litigation, 457 F. Supp. 1135 (N.D. Cal.
1978). The courts have typically implied a private cause of action under § 17(a) when intent
to defraud is present, making it unnecessary to reach the scienter issue. See, e.g., Kirshner
v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979). But
see Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 795 (7th Cir. 1977) (reserving the question
of implied private right under § 17(a) because necessary element of scienter not-supported
by record).
Some cases have focused upon scienter requirements solely for injunctive actions. See,
e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); SEC v. Asset Management Corp., [1979-1980 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. Soc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,278, at 96,971 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 10, 1979); SEC v.
Century Mortgage Co., 470 F. Supp. 300, 311 (D. Utah 1978). See generally Comment, Sci-
enter and SEC Injunctive Suits, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 1018 (1977).
40. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
41. 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
42. Compare SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978) (scienter not required in SEC
enforcement action under any part of § 17(a)), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979) and
Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976) (scienter not required in SEC enforcement
action under rule lOb-5) with SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978) (scienter required
in SEC enforcement action under rule 10b-5).
43. 446 U.S. at 697.
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justify restricting subsections (2) or (3) of section 17(a) to situa-
tions involving scienter.
The Court did not review congressional policy considerations
because section 17(a) is "clear in its context" and consistent with
legislative history." "Specifically, the language of section 17(a)(1) 45
denotes conduct." 46 By contrast, the language of sections 17(a)(2) 47
and 17(a)(3)48 does not suggest a scienter requirement.4 These lat-
ter sections focus on the effect of particular conduct rather than
the culpability of the person responsible.' 0
The Court, discussing the scienter question in the context of
rule 10b-5, stated:
[W]e do not write on a clean slate. Rather, the starting point for
our inquiry is Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, a case in which the
Court concluded that a private cause of action for damages will
not lie under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of an allega-
tion of scienter. Although the issue presented in the present case
was expressly reserved in Hochfelder, we nonetheless must be
guided by the reasoning of that decision.1
After Aaron the application of a singular standard, requiring
proof of scienter in both private and SEC actions under rule 10b-5,
militates in favor of a similar approach for section 17(a). Thus, the
scienter standard under section 17(a)(1) should be grafted on to
both SEC and private actions after the Hochfelder-Aaron progres-
sion. If a judge takes the initial step of implying a private cause of
action under section 17(a), he should adopt the Aaron scienter
analysis for that private right."
In Aaron the Court again avoided comment on the existence
of an implied private right under section 17(a).53 The decision did,
44. Id. at 695 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976)).
45. See supra note 1.
46. 446 U.S. at 696 (footnote added).
47. See supra note 1.
48. Id.
49. 446 U.S. at 696.
50. Id. at 696-97.
51. Id. at 689-90 (citations omitted).
52. Some courts have already required a showing of scienter in a § 17(a) private action.
See, e.g., Valles Salgado v. Piedmont Capital Corp., 452 F. Supp. 853, 858 n.8 (D.P.R. 1978);
Little v. First Cal. Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 96,225, at
92,554-55 (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 1977); see also Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 795
(7th Cir. 1977) (scienter "unquestionably required" for actions based on § 17(a)(1) and (3)).
53. 446 U.S. at 691 n.9. The Supreme Court has declined review of the issue in numer-
ous earlier opinions. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 557 n.9
(1979); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.13 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
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however, reiterate the Court's commitment to strict statutory con-
struction when reviewing federal securities law. Thus, it appears
that the Court will adhere to this construction even when it
"drives a wedge between section 10(b) and section 17(a)," as Jus-
tice Blackmun noted in his dissent in Aaron.54 Such treatment
yields a narrow scope of review when implied rights of action are
not expressly stated in either the statute or its legislative history.
Thus, the implication of a private right under section 17(a) con-
flicts with Hochfelder, its progeny, and the statutory scheme as a
whole.55 Despite the problems inherent in this interpretation, and
the recent posture taken by the Supreme Court, some lower courts
continue to treat the Court's handling of section 17(a) with
disdain."'
II. BEYOND RULE 10b-5-THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY'S EXPANSION
OF SECTION 17(a)
Aside from the scienter requirement, courts have given section
17(a) an expansive interpretation since Hochfelder. Admittedly,
section 17(a) is not coterminous with rule 10b-5. For example, an
offer to sell is sufficient to trigger application of section 17(a),
5 7
and actions against purchasers of securities are not contemplated
by the statute.58 In addition, application of section 17(a) had tradi-
tionally required a closer relationship between the fraudulent act
and the securities transaction than rule 10b-5.59 The necessity for
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733-34 n.6 (1975).
54. 446 U.S. at 715 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part). In a concurrence, Chief Justice
Burger strongly rebutted this statement. Lower courts should review the Chief Justice's
statement before creating a judicial remedy under the securities laws:
[It] is not this Court that 'drives a wedge;' Congress has done that. The Court's
holding is compelled in large measure by Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976), and gives effect to congressional intent as manifested in the language
of the statutes and in their histories. If, as intimated, the result is 'bad' public
policy, that is the concern of Congress where changes can be made.
Id. at 702-03 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
55. See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1233 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
57. See, e.g., SEC v. Spence & Green Chem. Co., 612 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1082 (1981). "While section 17(a) pertains to offers as well as sales, ...
rule 10b-5 appl[ies] only to acts occurring 'in connection with the purchase or sale' of securi-
ties." Id. at 903 (quoting rule 10b-5(c)).
58. See supra note 2.
59. SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 450 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1978): "We must emphasize,
however, that the plaintiff will have to demonstrate at trial a more direct involvement in the
offer or sale of securities to make out a § 17(a) violation than is necessary to establish a
violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." Id. at 916. Rule 10b-5 is in fact an expansion of §
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this closer relationship, however, has recently been relaxed as a re-
sult of the federal judiciary's expansion of section 17(a). This ex-
pansive reading of section 17(a) allows courts to apply the statute
to frauds considered only incidental to the sale of securities.
In United States v. Jensen,1e the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit held that section 17(a) will apply to
any transaction in which fraud is present, if the transaction con-
tains the sale of stock as an element. 1 Furthermore, in an attempt
to encompass the most attenuated circumstances, the fraud need
not relate specifically to the sale of the securities, but only to the
transaction which contained the sale.'
Another example of the expansive interpretation given section
17(a) is presented in Kirshner v. United States." In Kirshner the
beneficiary of a pension fund sued the United States, federal offi-
cials, and the trustees of the fund who, inter alia, bought and sold
New York City municipal bonds." As a result of misinformation
supplied by the fund, the IRS had issued tax rulings and Congress
had enacted legislation" that permitted the trustees to purchase a
large amount of securities issued by the City of New York." The
fund's purchases of the securities were sufficient to allow a claim
by the beneficiary under section 17(a).67 A dissent by Judge Moore
set forth a cryptic message that a majority of the federal judiciary
has to date ignored:
There has been a tendency over recent years to rely upon
various sections of the Securities Exchange laws to create causes
of action by the recital of section numbers such as § 10(b), Rule
10b-5 and § 17, as if the mere recital had a talismanic effect and
would bring some kind of a triable action into being."
17(a), and therefore, it would appear that an action under § 17(a) requires a closer tie with
the securities transaction than one brought under rule 10b-5. See supra note 31.
60. 608 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1979).
61. Id. at 1355. "If the sale of stock is an element, the transaction is within section
17(a), and if fraud is involved in the transaction, there is fraud in the sale of securities." Id.
62. Id. at 1354; see United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1976). "We see no
purpose in construing the statute [§ 17(a)] so narrowly and we have not in the past." Id. at
339.
63. 603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979).
64. Id. at 236-39.
65. Act of Aug. 20, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-236, 90 Stat. 238 (application of certain provi-
sions of Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to specified transactions by New York public em-
ployee retirement systems).
66. 603 F.2d at 237-38.
67. Id. at 241.
68. Id. at 242 (Moore, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court of the United States advanced the lower
court expansion of section 17(a) when it decided United States v.
Naftalin.e9 In Naftalin the Court upheld the criminal conviction,
under section 17(a)(1), of a professional investor who made short
sales of stock while falsely representing to the brokers that he
owned the stock he directed them to sell. 70 The Supreme Court
held that the language of section 17(a)(1) was broad enough to en-
compass frauds committed against brokers who had not purchased
the securities. 7' The Court's expansive interpretation in Naftalin
suggests that section 17(a), in the context of a criminal action, is at
least as broad as rule 10b-5 when the sale of securities is involved.
Such an interpretation may effectively preclude application of the
purchaser-seller requirement of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores72 to actions brought under section 17(a).7 1 Subsequently,
the Supreme Court, in Rubin v. United States,4 ruled that the
mere pledge of securities as collateral constituted a "sale" within
the meaning of section 17(a). 5
When reviewed together, these cases give a new but untested
vitality to section 17(a), independent of rule 10b-5. The existence
of an implied right of private action under section 17(a) is clearly
no longer the innocuous issue glossed over by Judge Friendly in
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.7 6 Implication of a private right of
action under section 17(a) will greatly impact upon the national
securities markets. Because the expansive interpretation of this
section primarily is a reaction to the recent limitations placed
69. 441 U.S. 768, 773 n.4 (1979) (the language of § 17(a), "in" the offer or sale, does not
necessarily connote a narrower range of activities than the phrase, "in connection with," of
§ 10(b)). For an excellent review of Naftalin and its relationship to an expanded reading of
§ 17(a), see Steinberg, supra note 7.
70. 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
71. 441 U.S. at 773-74. In the lower court decision in Naftalin, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit once again ruled against an expansion of § 17(a), this time
in a criminal context. 579 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 768 (1979); see Shull v.
Dain, Kalman & Quail, 561 F.2d 152, 159 (8th Cir. 1977) (rejecting implied action in a civil
case under § 17(a)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
72. 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (decided under rule 10b-5).
73. See Reid v. Madison, 438 F. Supp. 332, 334-35 (E.D. Va. 1977).
74. 449 U.S. 424 (1981); see United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 466-67 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976).
75. 449 U.S. at 431.
76. 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969):
Once it had been established, however, that an aggrieved buyer has a private
action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, there seemed little practical point in deny-
ing the existence of such an action under § 17-with the important proviso that
fraud, as distinct from mere negligence, must be alleged.
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upon rule 10b-5 actions, it is important to review the cases imply-
ing a private cause of action solely under section 17(a) after
Hochfelder.7 These recent lower court decisions must be weighed
and evaluated against the body of law developed by the Supreme
Court.7"
IV. RIGHTING WRONGS: THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY'S CREATION OF
AN IMPLIED RIGHT
Although the existence of an implied right of action under sec-
tion 17(a) was first recognized over thirty years ago,7 the long
shadow of rule 10b-5 made this recognition relatively meaningless
in the practical context of investor actions.80 The acknowledge-
ment of an implied private remedy under section 17(a) became im-
portant only after Hochfelder restricted application of rule 10b-5.
Following Hochfelder, plaintiffs began to aggressively pursue an
expansion of section 17(a)'s scope.
Since Hochfelder, virtually all of the United States courts of
appeals that have considered the question have expressly or im-
pliedly recognized a private cause of action under section 17(a). 1
77. Before Hochfelder, judges were less careful in implying a cause of action under
§ 17(a) because of the ease of obtaining a rule 10b-5 implied action. After Hochfelder im-
posed a scienter limitation on a private action under rule lOb-5, however, § 17(a) ceased to
be a secondary "coat-tail" issue. Thus, § 17(a) cases brought after Hochfelder must be re-
viewed independently of those cases decided before Hochfelder because of the primary im-
portance attached to a § 17(a) claim in the subsequent cases.
78. See supra note 18.
79. Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Two years later, in Fisch-
man v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 n.2 (2d Cir. 1951), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that a private action under § 17(a) might proceed free
of the restrictions imposed by § 11 of the 1933 Securities Act.
Professor Loss stated that the existence of a private right to damages under § 17(a)
seemed to be "taken for granted." 6 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 3913 (2d ed. Supp.
1969).
80. See supra note 76.
81. See Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1245 (7th Cir. 1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); accord Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d
1038, 1040 n.2 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding a cause of action under § 17(a)); Kirshner v. United
States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978) (section 17(a) supports a private claim for damages),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 698 n.30 (1st Cir. 1978)
(implying that a private right may be pursued under § 17(a)); Frischling v. Priest Oil & Gas
Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (finding a private right of action under § 17(a)); see
also Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (dismissing private
cause under § 17(a), but on statute of limitations grounds); Nickels v. Koehler Management
Corp., 541 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1976) (allowing claims under § 17(a) to proceed without being
barred by statute of limitations), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977). But see Goodweather v.
Thompson & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,352, at 92,187, [July-Dec.] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 630, at
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Only the Eighth Circuit has rejected the notion of a private rem-
edy under the section.
82
The primary analytical justification for implying a private ac-
tion under section 17(a) has been the similarity of language be-
tween that section and rule 10b-5. 88 Because a private right of ac-
tion is recognized under rule 10b-5, courts have freely implied a
similar private action under section 17(a). 84 This analogous reason-
ing led some courts to place restrictions on section 17(a) actions
similar to those imposed on actions under rule 10b-5 and section
A-7 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 16, 1981) (no private right of action under § 17(a)). See generally
Hazen, supra note 4.
In the Second Circuit, a three-judge panel recently tried to reserve the question
whether a private right of action exists under § 17(a), but was forced to amend its opinion in
light of the Kirshner holding. Wigand v. Flo-tek, Inc., 609 F.2d 1028, 1038 (2d Cir. 1980).
And at least one court has avoided deciding whether a private right of action exists under §
17(a) by relying instead on § 10(b). In Sterling Recreation Org. Co. v. Segal, [Jan.-June]
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 19, at 843 (D. Colo. Apr. 27, 1982), a United States district
court held that the existence of a private right of action under § 17(a) is "only relevant if
there is conduct that has damaged a plaintiff that is prohibited by § 17(a) and not by regu-
lations promulgated under § 10(b)."
Two pre-Hochfelder decisions continue to be good law. See Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d
97, 99 (4th Cir. 1975) (recognizing an implied cause of action under § 17(a)), followed in
Kaufman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 464 F. Supp. 528, 537 (D. Md. 1978);
Schultz v. Cally, 528 F.2d 470, 475 n.11 (3d Cir. 1975) (reserving the question). But see Hill
v. Der, 521 F. Supp. 1370, 1374 (D.C. Del. 1981) (no private right of action implied in
§ 17(a)).
The Fifth Circuit has avoided a determination of the issue since Hochfelder. See Pharo
v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 673-74 (5th Cir. 1980), where the court failed to reach the issue, but
noted that if there was an action under § 17(a), the same procedural restrictions applicable
to § 12 of the 1933 Act and § 10(b) of the 1934 Act would apply. The District of Columbia
Circuit, noting the conflict in the other circuits, has also left the issue open. See Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 350 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
Before Hochfelder, the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits implicitly allowed a § 17(a)
private claim for damages. None of the courts, however, elaborated on its decision. See Kell-
man v. ICS, Inc., 447 F.2d 1305 (6th Cir. 1971); Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 419 F.2d
152 (5th Cir. 1969); Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, 329 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1964).
Noting that the Supreme Court has not decided the issue, the Ninth Circuit recently de-
cided in favor of the existence of a private right of action under § 17(a). See Stephenson v.
Calpine Confers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808, 815 (9th Cir. 1981) (relying on the decision of the
Second Circuit in Kirshner).
At least one United States district court has remained adamantly opposed to the impli-
cation of a private right. Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, '472 F. Supp. 402,
404 n.3 (D. Colo. 1979) (stating that no federal district court in Colorado has held that there
is a private action under § 17(a)).
82. Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, 561 F.2d 152, 159 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978); see supra note 71.
83. Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1094 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Osborne v.
Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
84. Id. at 1095; see also supra note 76.
[Vol. 36:41
IMPLIED RIGHT
12(a). At times, courts required scienter in a section 17(a) private
action.a8 Alternatively, some courts subjected private actions under
section 17(a) to the same procedural restrictions present in section
12(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.88 This method aids in minimiz-
ing the disruption of the statutory scheme of the 1933 Act.8
These approaches appear, however, to rest upon inconsistent
logic. The courts find rule 10b-5 and section 12(a)(2) important
enough to provide relevant procedural limitations when they imply
an action under section 17(a). Nevertheless, they tend to ignore the
substantive differences between the provisions when they create a
section 17(a) implied right. But if section 17(a) is not substantively
different from rule 10b-5 and section 12(a)(2), the courts' work
construing section 17(a) has been pointless. It appears however
that just the opposite is true: the provisions differ significantly.88
When the courts recognize these differences, they will realize
that implying a private right under section 17(a) affects the pat-
tern and depth of enforcement of the securities laws. This implied
remedy causes increased securities costs due to excess litigation.
Moreover, attempts to prevent private allegations of fraud under
section 17(a) require a more carefully structured form of offer of
sale. It is not enough to say that the impact of these substantive
differences is minimized by imposing limitations drawn from other
provisions, since the most important statutory restriction, standing
85. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 461 F.
Supp. 999, 1006 (D.D.C. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Valles Salgado v. Piedmont Capital Corp., 452 F. Supp. 853,
858 n.8 (D.P.R. 1978); Little v. First Cal. Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 96,225, at 92,555 (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 1977).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976). Section 12(a) provides:
Any person who-
(2) offers or sells a security ... which includes an untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall
not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be lia-
ble to the person purchasing such security from him ....
87. See In re Gap Stores Secs. Litigation, 457 F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
(citing Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1972)). Imposing a pro-
cedural restriction on a § 12 civil remedy is arguably a part of the legislative intent of the
1933 Act. Analogizing an expansion of the 1934 Act's rule 10b-5 disrupts the statutory
scheme intended by Congress for the 1933 Act.
88. There has been a significant increase in the scope of § 17(a) during the past several
years due to the judicial gloss applied to the statute.
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to sue, will be removed. 8 This will place section 17(a) in the all too
familiar expanded posture of rule 10b-5 before the Supreme
Court's decisions in Hochfelder and subsequent cases.
If section 17(a) is to be given this expanded reading, the
courts must find an independent justification for the implication of
a private remedy other than general equity concepts of investor
protection rejected by the Supreme Court in limiting the scope of
rule 10b-5. One attempt to provide this independent justification is
the theory that rule 10b-5 private actions are useful only as an
analogy and are not dispositive of the issue. The theory then con-
cludes that the wording of section 17(a) is broad enough to support
the implication of its own private right of action without having to
refer to other statutory provisions.90
The potential ramifications of this approach are disturbing.
First, the analysis looks only at the statutory language, ignoring
considerations of congressional intent.91 Moreover, by concluding
that a private action under section 17(a) has an independent basis,
the analytical support for imposing restrictions garnered from
other statutory provisions is removed."
Another justification offered by the courts is that implying pri-
vate rights under section 17(a) assists the Securities and Exchange
Commission in enforcing the section." The proponents of this the-
ory also argue that the cases decided under rule 10b-5 provide pre-
cedent for the judiciary to impose its own notions of equity upon
the law." The argument is based upon the concept of investor pro-
tection. In an effort to achieve this goal of investor protection, the
courts appear willing to sacrifice other policies also inherent in the
securities laws, such as the maintenance and stability of a national
market.'5 This approach also indicates the willingness of the courts
to reject traditional methods of statutory construction."
89. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. The Court in Blue Chip held that only
purchasers and sellers of securities have standing under rule 10b-5.
90. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1245 (7th Cir. 1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
91. Recent Supreme Court cases have made it clear that congressional intent is the
relevant focus of analysis in these inquiries. See cases cited supra notes 11-12.
92. Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit used this ap-
proach in Daniel and implied that an action brought under § 17(a), unaccompanied by a
rule 10b-5 claim, need not prove scienter as an element. 561 F.2d at 1246 n.47.
93. See, e.g., Demoe v. Dean Witter & Co., 476 F. Supp. 275, 281 (D. Alaska 1979)
(implying a cause of action under § 17(a)(3)).
94. Id.
95. See infra note 118.
96. See generally Hazen, supra note 4, at 654 n.70.
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Implying a private right of action under section 17(a) would
doubtlessly provide a major benefit to the SEC enforcement pro-
gram. The deterrent effect alone would be substantial. Neverthe-
less, these policy arguments were offered by the SEC against the
imposition of a scienter standard in rule 10b-5 actions, but were
rejected by the Supreme Court in Hochfelder.1
7
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's restriction of rule
10b-5, the lower federal courts are demonstrating a disturbing will-
ingness to selectively ignore Supreme Court precedent and reject
legislative intent in favor of their own notions of an extended form
of investor protection. Yet notions of equity must arise from and
be limited by the statute and its accompanying legislative history,
not the subjective perceptions of the judiciary. Legislative, not ju-
dicial intent must provide the grounds for determining whether to
imply a private right of action under a statute. This proposition
was clearly reinforced by two recent Supreme Court decisions.
V. THE MODIFIED Cort ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has not expressly determined whether an
implied private right of action exists under section 17(a)." If the
question comes before the Court, recent decisions leave little doubt
that a majority of the Justices" will override the lower courts' ex-
pansive reading of section 17(a), and thereby maintain the integ-
rity of the securities laws as enacted by Congress.100
97. 425 U.S. at 214.
98. See supra note 53. The other "§ 17(a)" case to be noted is Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). In Redington the Court held that there was no implied
private right of action under § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78q(a) (1976). 442 U.S. at 569. The section is not comparable to § 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
99. Only Justice Brennan has consistently rejected a narrow reading of the federal se-
curities laws, joining or drafting the dissent in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Trans-
america Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); and Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Justice Blackmun has followed a similar trend with
dissents in Blue Chip, Hochfelder, Santa Fe (dissenting in part), and Aaron. The remaining
Justices have shown surprising agreement in the narrow construction and evaluation of the
federal securities laws with respect to implied private rights. See infra note 108.
100. Cf. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (no private right
under § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560 (1979) (no private right under § 17(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act); see
also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (no private right under the Freedom of
Information or the Trade Secrets Acts). But cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677 (1979) (implying a private right of action under title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982) (lesser
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The seminal case in interpreting an implied private statutory
remedy is Cort v. Ash.'' During the 1978 Term, the Supreme
Court considered the question of implied private rights of action at
least five times,' and in each case applied the detailed analysis
developed in Cort.
Cort sets forth four specific factors to determine if a private
remedy is implicit in a statute that does not expressly provide for
one. 10 3 First, the private plaintiff must be "one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted."'' If the statute
fails to create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff, then no fur-
ther inquiry is needed: the plaintiff lacks standing and the private
right of action is precluded. Second, the Cort analysis looks to the
legislative intent, using available sources such as committee re-
ports. 1 5 Third, the court must decide whether the implication of a
private remedy is "consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme."'10 These related factors allow an additional re-
view of the legislative intent that underlies the structure and de-
velopment of the statute. Finally, Cort requires a basic application
of the principles of federalism to ensure that the judicial implica-
tion of a private remedy does not usurp "an area basically the con-
cern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on Federal law."'10
showing required to imply right of action under Commodity Exchange Act when implied
right antedated statute).
The Supreme Court last acknowledged the existence of a private right of action in the
securities field in Hochfelder. There, the Court bowed to 25 years of judicial precedent. 425
U.S. at 196. Yet an implied private right of action under rule 10b-5 would probably not be
upheld if the issue were presented to the Court today. But cf. Transamerica Mortgage Advi-
sors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (refusing to imply a private right of action under a section
of another act that is similar in wording to rule 10b-5).
The ambush awaiting private plaintiffs under § 17(a) at the Supreme Court level is
evidenced by the Court's conservative trend in deciding recent securities cases. See, e.g.,
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (narrowly construing the
definition of a security); cases cited supra notes 19-21. This clear manifestation by the Su-
preme Court of its position renders the lower federal court decisions that imply a private
right of action under § 17(a) all the more questionable.
101. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
102. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 562 n.1 (1979).
103. 422 U.S. at 78.
104. Id. (quoting Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (emphasis added
by the Court)).






The Cort test has undergone substantial modification since it
was first formulated by the Supreme Court, especially in the area
of securities law. 08 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington'0e presents
one such modification. The Court in Redington acknowledged that
the factors set forth in Cort formed the traditional judicial criteria
used to determine whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute
that does not expressly provide for one."10 These factors were not,
however, weighed equally. The "central inquiry" became whether
Congress actually intended to create a private right, thereby mak-
ing the right more difficult to obtain."'
The Redington decision revised the Cort analysis by imposing
a two-part threshold inquiry. First, the statute must either grant
an express private right to an identifiable class or imply one by
proscribing some conduct as unlawful. If a plaintiff fails to meet
this first factor, he lacks the minimum constitutional criteria for
standing and his asserted implied right will be rejected. If this ele-
108. Characterizing the current Supreme Court as "conservative" in the securities law
field is probably accurate, but the conservative results seem to rest more on the desire to
interpret statutes narrowly and avoid proliferation of litigation than on the desire to favor
defendants. Nevertheless, it is possible to characterize the attitudes of Justices by keeping
track of their decisions. For what it is worth, the outcome of cases can be characterized as
pro-plaintiff or pro-SEC and as pro-defendant or anti-SEC. Using this approach, the eight
sitting Justices who have decided securities law cases can be ranked on rough percentages.
Asking the question in terms of whether each Justice has decided cases in favor of defen-
dants or against the SEC, the pro-defendant or anti-SEC rankings are as follows:
Number of Pro-Defendant/
cases Anti-SEC %
1. Powell 36 27 75
2. Rehnquist 35 26 74
3. Burger 41 28 68
4. Blackmun 39 20 51
5. Stevens 19 9 47
6. Marshall 41 18 48
7. White 49 18 44
8. Brennan 53 14 26
The above figures are slightly skewed because of the relatively high number of private
rights cases. Private rights cases, however, offer some insights into judicial philosophy. Re-
marks by David S. Ruder, Dean and Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of
Law, on Supreme Court Influence on Corporate Securities Litigation, at the 20th Annual
Corporate Counsel Institute, Chicago, Illinois, October 15, 1981 (available in the University
of Miami Law School library).
109. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
110. Id. at 575-76. As the Court stated, these criteria were "the language and focus of
the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose." Id.
111. Id.
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ment is satisfied, the court will inquire into the second threshold
factor: the plaintiff must demonstrate that the implied private ac-
tion is based solely on federal law. A plaintiff is required to show
this exclusively federal basis because of the structure of federalism
implicit in the Constitution. The Redington Court' imposed these
threshold factors because the Constitution mandates these limita-
tions upon the judiciary's creation of a statutorily implied right of
action. Once a plaintiff demonstrates that he has met these thresh-
old criteria, he must show that all four Cort factors are satisfied
before a court may properly imply a private remedy.'
12
At this point, it would be instructive to apply the Cort-Red-
ington analysis to section 17(a). Section 17(a) clearly makes certain
conduct unlawful."' Thus, the first part of the modified Cort-Red-
ington threshold test is met. And because enforcement of securities
laws has long been a bifurcated task requiring participation by
both federal and state governments, the Constitution's federal
structure does not prohibit the existence of an implied right of
action.
The remaining Cort factors pose a more serious, if not insur-
mountable barrier to a private right of action under section
17(a)."" Both the legislative history and the statutory scheme show
that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action
under section 17(a)."1 Under the modified Cort test, the principal
factor in determining whether a statute creates an implied right is
the intent of Congress."' The courts, at the time of this writing,
have failed to reconcile legislative intent with the use of section
17(a) as a basis for a private cause of action.
112. Compare Redington, 442 U.S. at 575-76 with Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-25 (1979).
113. See supra note 1.
114. But see Steinberg, supra note 7, for an analysis of the Cort test applied to § 17(a)
that yielded a contrary result. Steinberg reviews the factors applied in recent Supreme
Court cases and concludes that it is possible for defrauded offerees and purchasers of securi-
ties to pursue private damage remedies under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at
163. This article was written before the recent Supreme Court decision, Transamerica Mort-
gage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), which denied an implied private right of action
under § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940-a provision substantially similar to
§17(a). One court has already rejected the argument offered by Steinberg as inappropriate
in a civil action. McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 650 n.28 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
115. See notes 118-23 and accompanying text infra.
116. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 575-76; Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 23-25. But cf. Note, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933: Implication of a Private Right of Action, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 244 (1981) (lack of




As noted in Hochfelder, the legislative scheme of the securities
laws works as an integrated whole. 117 Examined in this context, the
securities laws are designed to facilitate several objectives. Investor
protection was not only an end in itself; it was also a means of
maintaining a stable and ongoing securities market.16 Congress in-
tended to create a balanced scheme that would protect investors
and encourage investment without imposing unnecessary costs on
those seeking capital.1"9 Within this statutory scheme Congress
provided for civil remedies applicable to certain sections.120 Section
17(a) is not one of these. The failure of Congress to provide a civil
remedy for section 17(a) cannot be dismissed as an oversight. As a
result, courts should assume that the legislature knew how to pro-
vide for private actions in the statute and chose not to do so in this
section of the 1933 Act.
When express remedies are granted in the securities laws, they
are subject to procedural limitations specifically devised to imple-
ment congressional intent regarding the workings of that particular
section within the overall statutory scheme. For example, section
12(2) allows recovery for certain negligent behavior, but requires
privity between the purchaser and the seller, and only provides for
rescission as a remedy.19 ' This careful delineation of constraints
exemplifies the absence of any congressional intent to create a sec-
117. 425 U.S. at 206.
118. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933):
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest busi-
ness ....
The aim is . . . to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest pres-
entation, against the competition afforded by dishonest securities offered to the
public through crooked promotion; to restore the confidence of the prospective
investor in his ability to select sound securities; to bring into productive chan-
nels of industry and development capital which has grown timid to the point of
hoarding; and to aid in providing employment and restoring buying and consum-
ing power.
As this quotation makes clear, Congress intended securities regulation to benefit society as a
whole by maintaining markets. At the time of the legislation, investors had been driven out
of the market by the 1929 stock market crash and their protection was a means to a larger
end. Taken to its logical extension, this argument suggests that in the current market, even
less protection is needed because sophisticated institutional investors, economically capable
of taking care of themselves, dominate the market.
119. See supra note 17.
120. There are seven express civil remedies provided by the 1933 and 1934 securities
acts. There are three in the Securities Act of 1933: §§ 11, 12, and 15 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
77k, 77L, 77o (1976)). There are four express civil remedies in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934: §§ 9, 16, 18, and 20 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78p, 78r, 78t (1976)).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
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tion providing civil remedies without any limitations on its appli-
cation. Section 12(2) and section 17(a) are essentially counterparts
in the 1933 Act.' Consequently, an analysis of section 12(2) is es-
pecially relevant to the question of an implied right under section
17(a). It would be contrary to congressional intent for the courts to
allow a private right of action that would circumvent the statutory
constraints reflected by the limitations of section 12(2).12s
Despite this legislative history, the lower courts have allowed a
private right of action under section 17(a), analogizing it to the
implied private right of action under rule 10b-5.2 4 This focus ig-
nores the Redington Court's insistence, recently reaffirmed in Cur-
ran, that the central inquiry be on the statutory language and con-
gressional intent.'25 The Redington approach prevents the courts
from indiscriminately applying to section 17(a) their own construc-
tion of a similarly worded provision that is outside the statute.
These recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the Court
would deny that a private right of action is implicit within section
17(a) simply because it is similar to rule 10b-5. This warning to the
lower courts is especially manifest in the Supreme Court's recent
decision that denied an implied right of action under a statute
122. Both § 12(2) and § 17(a) are part of the 1933 Act. Section 12(2) establishes civil
remedies for fraud while § 17(a) creates criminal sanctions for fraud.
123. An excellent summary of the sources construing congressional intent appeared in
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.:
[T]here is unanimity among the commentators, including some who were in a
peculiarly good position to know, that § 17(a)(2) of the 1933 Act-indeed the
whole of § 17-was intended only to afford a basis for injunctive relief and, on a
proper showing, for criminal liability, and was never believed to supplement the
actions for damages provided by §§ 11 and 12. See Landis, Liability Sections of
Securities Act, 18 Am. Acct. 330, 331 (1933); Douglas and Bates, Federal Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 43 Yale L.J. 171, 181-82 (1933); 3 Loss, Securities Regulation
1785-86 (1961). When the House Committee Report listed the sections that "de-
fine the civil liabilities imposed by the Act" it pointed only to §§ 11 and 12 and
stated that "[tio impose a greater responsibility [than that provided by §§ 11
and 12] *** would unnecessarily restrain the conscientious administration of
honest business with no compensating advantage to the public." H. Rep. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1933).
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring)
(emphasis added), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see also Horton, supra note 8.
124. See, e.g., Demoe v. Dean Witter & Co., 476 F. Supp. 275, 281 (D. Alaska 1979).
125. Despite the identical nature of the language, analysis under § 17(a) and rule 10b-5
differs. The language similarity is due to historical accident rather than congressional intent.
See supra note 31. Furthermore, different statutes are involved. Rule 10b-5 looks to § 10(b)
of the 1934 Act while § 17(a) is part of the 1933 Act.
The Court in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982),
held that in addition to legislative intent, courts should review the state of the law when the
legislation was enacted. Id. at 1841.
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strikingly similar to both rule 10b-5 and section 17(a).
C. Transamerica: The Final Warning?
In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis,3 6 the Court re-
fused to imply a private right of action under section 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940,1'7 despite the fact that the lan-
guage of subsections (1) and (2) is substantially identical to subsec-
tions (a) and (c) of rule 10b-5 and subsections (1) and (3) of sec-
tion 17(a). 128
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 does not provide any ex-
press remedies whatsoever. 129 Thus, the Court did not need to con-
sider the impact of an implied right on "counterpart" provisions
such as sections 12(2) and 17(a) of the 1933 Act. 80 The Court fo-
cused instead on the fact that Congress had "expressly provided
both judicial and administrative means for enforcing compliance"
that did not contemplate private actions for damages.'' The Court
found it "highly improbable that 'Congress absentmindedly forgot
to mention an intended private action.' ,,2 Finding no legislative
intent mandating a contrary result, the Court held that no implied
private right of action exists under section 206. as
126. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). In Transamerica a shareholder of a real estate investment
trust brought derivative and class actions against the trust, its advisers, and others, alleging
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. The shareholder argued that clients of investment advis-
ers are intended beneficiaries of the Investment Advisers Act, and thus the Court should
imply a private cause of action in their favor under § 206 of the Act. The Court refused to
recognize such a right under the section despite its similarity to rule 10b-5 and § 17(a).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). Section 206 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser by use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or pro-
spective client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client.
Id.
128. Compare supra note 127 with supra notes 1 & 3.
129. 444 U.S. at 18; see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
130. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
131. 444 U.S. at 20.
132. Id. (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
133. 444 U.S. at 23-25. Once again the Supreme Court refused to usurp congressional
powers and declined to provide an implied right when the right neither existed nor was
intended under the federal securities laws. "[T]he 1970 amendments to the [Investment
Company] Act is another clear indication that Congress knew how to confer a private right
of action when it wished to do so." Id. at 23 n.13.
The Court did hold, however, that a limited private remedy exists under § 215 of the
Act. Section 215 declares that contracts made in violation of the statute shall be void. 15
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The Transamerica Court went well beyond the Cort-Reding-
ton threshold analysis necessary to deny the implication of a pri-
vate right of action under section 17(a). The Court did not need to
review the grant of express private rights in other parts of the stat-
ute for it to deny the implied action. The Court was, in effect, stat-
ing that the existence of a public means of enforcement was suffi-
cient to raise a presumption against the existence of a private
right.134 This presumption, moreover, could be overcome only by a
persuasive showing of legislative intent to the contrary.' Without
speculating on the proof needed to meet this burden, one may
safely conclude that this showing is not possible under section
17(a) because there is little legislative history concerning this
section.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE COURTS As CAVALRY
The federal courts presently construe section 17(a) to provide
substantive advantages over previously favored causes of action."
Since the demise of rule 10b-5,187section 17(a) appears to be the
panacea for recovery under the securities laws without the stric-
tures of section 12(2). The willingness of the courts to assist de-
frauded investors by implying a private right of action under sec-
tion 17(a), however, rests upon dubious legal reasoning and an
unfounded reliance on stare decisis. This policy of "investor pro-
tection at all costs" remains deeply rooted in the judicial mind and
creates a substantial imbalance in the federal securities laws. The
lower courts are too willing to further the policy of investor protec-
tion at the expense of society as a whole, which ultimately bears
the burden of the additional cost of raising capital.
The Transamerica decision, however, exemplifies the Supreme
Court's emphatic desire to leave legislative questions involving risk
U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1979). The Court determined that Congress contemplated private litigation
when enacting § 215 because it must have realized that the customary legal incidences of
voidness-rescission, injunction, and restitution-would require resolution through private
means. 444 U.S. at 18-19, 24; see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 102
S. Ct. 1825 (1982) (1974 amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act do not destroy previ-
ously recognized implied private right of action for damages for violation of the Act).
134. 444 U.S. at 19-20.
135. "Even settled rules of statutory construction could yield, of course, to persuasive
evidence of a contrary legislative intent." Id. But see Hazen, Implied Private Remedies
Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil Rights, Securi-
ties Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1333 (1980).
136. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 18.
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and cost allocation to Congress. Following Hochfelder, the Su-
preme Court will presumably restrain the expansion of section
17(a) in the lower courts. Even so, the failure of the lower courts to
abide by elementary tenets of statutory interpretation is disturbing
and will likely continue until the Court rules on the section 17(a)
question directly. This casual but conscious interference with the
statutory scheme created by Congress raises serious doubts about
the judiciary's perception of its role in the law. Judges may judge,
interpret, and construe. They should not attempt to create the law
out of whole cloth.
The impropriety of this judicial legislation is clear when one
considers that the development traced in this article occurred after
the Supreme Court, in Hochfelder and its progeny, rejected the
idea that investor protection was the sole justification for the se-
curities laws. In the final analysis, judicial notions of equity should
remain subservient to those of society as reflected in the laws
passed by Congress. To conclude otherwise signals the rejection of
a principle fundamental to the structure of American law.
The authors hope that another twenty-five year period will not
elapse before the Supreme Court reviews a section 17(a) private
action case. By then, the weight of lower court precedent may once
again, as in rule 10b-5, force the Court to concede that an implied
private right is well-established even though in derogation of rec-
ognized statutory principles pervasive throughout the federal se-
curities laws.lse
138. The potential for decision rests with the Supreme Court now in a case in which the
Court recently granted certiorari, Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 540-41
& n.4 (5th Cir.), modified and reh'g denied, 650 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102
S. Ct. 1766 (1982) (Nos. 81-680 & 81-1076). The respondent in its brief to the Court has
framed in the following manner the issue as to whether § 17(a) warrants the implication of a
private right of action:
Although no contemporaneous authoritative discussion provides an answer
as to Congress's intent to provide an implied remedy for violations of § 10(b),
the same is not true as to § 17(a) of the 1933 Act. On October 30, 1933, Commis-
sioner Landis of the Federal Trade Commission addressed the New York State
Society of Certified Public Accountants and dealt with the issue of civil liability
under § 17(a) as follows:
The suggestion has been made on occasion that civil liabilities arise
also from a violation of § 17, the first subsection of which makes
unlawful the circulation of falsehoods and untruths in connection
with the sale of a security in interstate commerce or through the
mails. But a reading of this section in the light of the entire Act
leaves no doubt but that violations of its provisions give rise only to
a liability to be restrained by injunctive action or, if wilfully done, to
a liability to be punished criminally. That such a conclusion alone is
justifiably to be drawn from its provisions is a matter upon which the
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commission has already made a pronouncement, the authoritative
quality of which I shall occasion to consider later.
The American Accountant, "Liability Sections of Securities Act Authoritatively
Discussed," November 1933, p. 332.
Further on, Commissioner Landis discusses Federal Trade Commission ac-
tivity in interpreting the 1933 Act:
The United States Government, speaking this time through the
agency of the Federal Trade Commission, says to an issuer-act in
such a fashion and no rights, either criminal or civil, will be created
against you. It would, indeed, be unusual if action and reliance upon
such advice should be treated by another agency of the same govern-
went-the courts-as subjecting the parties so advised to liability.
This recognition of the fact of there being something akin to estoppel
present in such action by the commission, has naturally made the
commission, as distinguished from its divisional officials, chary of the
exercise of these powers. Only two commission opinions have thus
far been rendered, and these naturally merely make explicit what is
already implicit within the Act. (Emphasis added)
Id. at 334.
Commissioner Landis' description of the effect of Federal Trade Commis-
sion action is supported by the section of the 1934 Act which provides for the
transfer of duties from the Federal Trade Commission to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission:
Sec. 210. Upon the expiration of sixty days after the date upon which
a majority of the members of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion appointed under Sec. 4 of Title I of this Act have qualified and
taken office, all powers, duties, and functions of the Federal Trade
Commission under the Securities Act of 1933 shall be transferred to
the Commission .... All orders, rules, and regulations which have
been issued by the Federal Trade Commission under the Securities
Act of 1933 and which are in effect shall continue in effect until mod-
ified, superseded, revoked, or repealed. All rights and interests accru-
ing or to accrue under the Securities Act of 1933, or any provision of
any regulation relating to, or out of any action taken by, the Federal
Trade Commission under such act, shall be followed in all respects
and may be exercised and enforced.
No suggestion is intended that the Court is estopped by a 1933 interpreta-
tive opinion of the Federal Trade Commission from inferring a private remedy
under § 17(a). It is submitted, however, that the foregoing provides an insight
into the "contemporary legal context" in which the 1933 and 1934 Acts were
enacted.
Brief for Respondent at 38-40, Huddleston.
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